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The Double Social Life of Methods 
Introduction 
 
How might we think about social research methods? 
There’s a standard answer to this question, which we dub the ‘methodological complex’. It 
assumes that methods are tools for learning about the social world. That this is what they are. 
End of story. We see this in methods courses. Juxtaposed and differentiated both from theory, 
and from substantive courses, these tell us about techniques for knowing the world. Which to 
choose. How to use them. How to analyse data. And how to present it. 
There’s nothing wrong with this in certain senses: in social research indeed we need methods, 
and it’s not a bad idea to use those methods properly. But to think of methods in this way – 
simply as appropriate tools – involves consequences, some of them unanticipated, which 
create a baggage which can be heavy, even burdensome. We can distil this as ‘the 
methodological complex.’ This has three elements.  
First note the division of labour. Theory, substance, and method. These three realms are held 
separate from each other, so that research questions and issues are derived from theory (‘as 
hypotheses’ in more positivist approaches), and methods provide the tools that allow such 
questions to be tested, with respect to various ‘substantive’ areas. We see here a division of 
labour in the project of empirical social inquiry which imagines this in a particular and 
contestable way. Is theory really big? Does it actually do the methodological and empirical 
driving? And method? Is method really just technique? The appliance of science? The 
questions are rhetorical. The answer is: obviously not. And no doubt most social scientists 
would agree. The world of social inquiry is much messier than any such caricature. 
Second, however, the resistance to this framing can actually reinforce the ‘methodological 
complex’. Thus, it is hardly new to resist the instrumentalism involved in deeming methods to 
be tools:  critical theory, notably that of the Frankfurt School, has made this a major plank of 
its interventions since the 1930s. This move finds it apogee in Habermas’ distinction between 
instrumental, hermeneutic and critical modes of knowledge in Knowledge and Human 
Interests
1
. However, this differentiation allowed theory and humanistic methods to be seen as 
‘the line of flight’ (to use a Deleuzian term) as bearing the potential to resist instrumentalism. 
This actually further instantiates a rift between theory and method which can itself produce 
the kind of theoreticist orientation to knowledge which has been at least partially in evidence 
with aspects of the ‘cultural turn’ . 
Third, a further differentiation in this instrumentalist rendering of methods as tools is that it 
buys into the idea that there’s a world out there. It then assumes that this world has particular 
and definite features. And then it assumes that those features may be reported, and turned into 
data
2. But what’s going on when we make these assumptions?  
One answer is that we’re setting up a binary divide. We’re distinguishing between the world 
on the one hand, and representations of that world on the other. In this way of thinking it’s 
methods that bridge the gap. If we get those methods right then our representations will match 
the realities of the world. Tools have a better or worse capacity to do the job at hand. They 
will, as the philosophers of science say correspond to it; or at least (this is what the 
pragmatists say) they will describe it sufficiently well to be treated as accurate. This means 
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that they are tools for handling the world. If we get them wrong then our accounts of reality, 
our data, will be flawed. 
Looking at this third point, sceptics may respond that in fact plenty of methodologists resist 
‘objectivism’, and many methods textbooks also parade a variety of ‘humanistic’ methods 
which can define a more constructionist take on the world. The power of this current is 
evident from the work of Berger and Luckmann
3, through Foucault’s discourse theory4 and 
even Bourdieu’s field analysis5. But in fact this ‘line of flight’ is also problematic. It 
instantiates questionable humanist assumptions about social relations into the research process 
(such as the phenomenological concern with experience) which are then signally out of kilter 
with post-humanist theorists such as those in science studies.  
The problem, then is that social research oscillates between an objectivist concern with ‘bias’ 
and a humanist response which seeks refuge in an ‘ineffable’ human moment which somehow 
lies outside this purview of representational methods. It is this complex oscillation that we 
resist in this paper. But before proceeding, let us be clear about the attractions of the 
objectivist, instrumentalist framing. By reducing issues to questions of technique, it allows 
different parties to come together around some kind of shared project, whatever their goals, 
values, orientations and identities. If we need to create random samples, then this is because it 
is important to avoid undistorted samples. If it is dangerous to avoid recruiting so-called 
professional participants to our focus groups, then this is because we’re looking for people 
who are naïve and untutored in appropriate ways. If the ethnographer needs to avoid the 
outsiders who flock to talk with her when she first arrives in the field, then this is because 
she’s on the lookout for gatekeepers or people at the core of the community rather than people 
with grudges on the periphery. We learn all these things in a million different versions in the 
hope of reducing bias; in the hope of knowing and describing the world accurately. This 
search to avoid bias and to use our ‘tools’ more effectively is pervasive, indeed ubiquitous. 
We share it. But it then also leads to an automatic response, from even the most positivistic 
researcher, about ‘what is left out’ by any specific method. Hence, a concern with ‘the margin 
for error’ is built into the ‘methodological complex’.  
To repeat, it is not wrong to treat methods as a matter of technique. But we are concerned to 
develop another methods agenda too, which is slowly being articulated. It’s the agenda that 
animates many of the research concerns in CRESC. And it has to do with we’re calling the 
social life of method. 
So what does it mean to talk of the social life of method? We want to argue that it’s helpful to 
think of the double social life of method. Here’s a quick version of the argument. This starts 
from the view that we have begun to elaborate above, that it is unhelpful to separate out 
theory, method and substance, and so to generate an oscillation between instrumentalist and 
humanistic understandings of social research methods. Instead it starts from the recognition 
that methods are fully of the social world that they research; that they are fully imbued with 
theoretical renderings of the social world. This starting point leads us to two arguments. First, 
methods are social because they are constituted by the social world of which they are a part. 
This step is relatively easy. It is closely allied to cognate arguments made about scientific 
methods by researchers in STS. But we also take a second step: they are social because they 
also help to constitute that social world. In saying this we do not embrace a simple 
constructionism, for to do this depends on holding the world (acted upon, and constructed) 
separate from its tools and representations – which is precisely what we contest here. And, as 
we will show, there is no omnipotent ‘methods machine’ able to produce anything it wants. 
Despite considerable investment, some methods fail to produce hoped-for results. Rather, we 
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are concerned with the world as complex assemblage. Methods are fully of the world that they 
are also active in constituting. 
 
Methods of the Social: I 
Version number one. Methods are constituted by the social world of which they are a part.  
In one way this is blindingly obvious. First, methods don’t come into being without a purpose. 
And, second, they don’t come into being without advocates, or more exactly without forms of 
patronage. Often the state has been the key player here.  
In the eighteenth, and even more in the nineteenth century, states needed to know their 
territories. The result? Techniques of surveying and map-making; in the UK the Ordnance 
Survey
6
. And then the state also needed to know its populations. It wanted, it needed, to 
govern its people. Obviously people may be governed in endless kinds of groupings: as 
classes; communities; estates; and syndicates. But for states, population is the category of 
governing and involves states constituting people as individuals – and the subjectivities that 
go with this
7
. It involves classifying, categorising and enumerating people’s specific 
characteristics, and aggregating those individuals and characteristics together to form a 
governable national population. It is through techniques such as censuses that states have 
come to locate and identify the people who inhabit their territories and make them into a 
population. The UK census started, as we know, in 1801, but as writers as diverse as Michel 
Foucault, Nikolas Rose and Timothy Mitchell have shown, this strategy for governmentality 
comes in many varieties
8
. 
 
So methods have a purpose and they have advocates. They also build on whatever came 
before. So, for instance, while the census made people inhabiting a territory into a national 
population, subsequently that population reality could be further calibrated through the 
technique of sample statistics in the mid-twentieth century. So there’s a history of method to 
be told here
9
. In the US, for instance, sample surveys grew up with the Gallup polls of the late 
1930s
10
, and then with agencies such as the Department of Agriculture during the Second 
World War
11
. Mike Savage traces their analogous though later rise in the UK
12
. He shows, for 
instance, how during the Second World War, the Government Social Survey became a key 
instrument in generating knowledge of the circumstances and concerns of the British 
population. It proved popular in part because its methods of anonymous sampling avoided 
relying on known informants, in a way that had attracted popular opprobrium. The 
government proved a key player in promoting survey research into the 1960s, seeing it as part 
of a modernising form of government that no longer needed to rely on the views of the ‘good 
and the great’. It proved important in shaping educational reform in the 1960s, with surveys 
being used to explain the social selectivity of grammar schools. As Hilton
13
 and Savage have 
shown, these methods were thus embraced by a technocratic middle class, seeking to 
distinguish themselves from older gentlemanly intellectuals. Through these means, academics 
– and perhaps especially sociologists – got in on the act too. The result was that the sample 
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survey became – has become – a core tool for knowing the social in industrial societies. 
Perhaps, in an era of quantification, it became the pre-eminent tool. 
But analogous stories may be told for other methods. Indeed for other disciplines. For 
instance anthropological ethnography insisted on the importance of studying colonised 
peoples qualitatively, and often holistically and functionally, ‘in their own terms’. Why? The 
caricatural response – but it is a caricature that also deserves some respect – is that it was 
important to understand the difference between the West and the uncivilised rest, but also 
important (and as a part of this) to understand the logics of the colonised. It’s a commonplace 
that this was an endeavour indissolubly linked with imperialism; with governing, with 
civilising, and with controlling empires. And the connection was inescapable, even for critical 
anthropologists. The position of privilege – and privileged access – came both literally and 
metaphorically with the colonial territory
14
.  
So that’s the first argument. Social research methods need advocates and some kind of 
ecological context if they are to survive. They are tools for knowing the world that are of 
those advocates and ecological circumstances. And, as we have been hinting, in the twentieth 
century the relevant agendas often grew up in the relations between the state, the (largely 
state-funded) academy, and a range of private sector businesses as well as political groups and 
social movements. We mentioned Gallup a moment ago. But Gallup was simply at the front 
of the queue, historically at least. Here’s another example of the private sector at work in 
advocating methods: the focus group.  
A version of the focus group was created in the space between the academy and the state in 
US media research early in the Second World War. Interestingly, it was Frankfurt School 
theorists such as Theodor Adorno who played an important role in developing an interest in 
focus groups, a striking example of the way that the gap between theory and methods was by 
no means as strong in this period as it was subsequently to become. Popularised by Paul 
Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, it was used to explore how well radio programmes sold war 
bonds
15
. But then (to put it quickly) it largely disappeared from the academy. Why? Perhaps 
in the high era of American quantitative sociology it wasn’t scientific and statistical enough. 
In any case, whatever the reasons, it only reappeared in any serious way in the academy in the 
1980s
16
. So where had it been? The answer is: in the private sector. Indeed, it had been 
transmuted into a core tool for marketing research. So the 1980s saw its transfer back to the 
academy. A process that sometimes, not always, meant that it was also re-theorised. Here was 
the question. What does the talk in a focus group actually tell us? Does it tell us about 
attitudes? That’s a common, and probably the predominant, view. Or does it (here comes the 
re-theorising) tell us something about how people negotiate and make positional arguments in 
contexts saturated by power relations? This is how it remerged in at least some of its 
academic versions
17. That’s quite a difference. It’s a difference driven by the agendas of 
critical social science.  
There are plenty of other examples of the way that methods come out of the complex tensions 
between different kinds of advocates during the course of the 20
th
 century. We might see the 
competing visions of knowledge coming from the humanities (associated with traditional 
aristocratic, professional and gentlemanly interests) and the social sciences (linked to more 
technocratic currents) as fundamental. For many authors in the 20
th
 century, writing novels 
was a form of social research, a means of elaborating social relations (see intriguingly, 
Marilyn Strathern on Jane Austen
18
). It was a new breed of social researchers, armed with 
interviews, sample surveys and questionnaires who made it clear (to themselves, at least) that 
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novelists were not doing social research, though they might be good entertainers or able to 
provide insight into psychological states.   
These concerns straightforwardly illustrate our suggestion that methods are of the social. It 
shows how research methods embody the concerns of advocates and subsist in particular 
contexts or environments
19
. Second and as a part of this, it illustrates the importance of critical 
thinking about method, about what it is that methods are doing, and the status of the data that 
they’re making. We’ll return to this thought in due course. And then third, it tells us that 
methods do not necessarily reflect only the concerns of the academy. There are being 
constituted, and often on a large scale, by other advocates. And this is perhaps our biggest 
social science challenge: how to handle the challenge of methods that are of advocates or 
subsist in ecological contexts that have little or nothing to do with social science and its 
characteristically critical concerns. 
A quick version of the story runs so. Social research methods are proliferating.
20
 The 
commonplace is that this has partly, perhaps substantially, to do with the digitisation of 
everyday life and the growth of digital transactional data
21
. We know that the flows of people, 
of goods, of vehicles, of information and of money are all being recorded. And we know, too, 
that they’re being analysed using digital methods advocated by a variety of individuals and 
organisations that cannot be easily summarised as being of the state, private sector or the 
academy. These methods do things such as identify patterns and associations that are of 
interest to those who develop and/or use them, patterns that often take the form of 
visualisations. And those interests and purposes are multiple. A sample list might include: 
state security, targeted marketing, personal health tracking, wikis and open source analytics, 
crime control, child protection, firm patenting strategies, disease control, supply-chain 
logistics, public issues and concerns, military battlefield tactics, changing linguistic usages, 
Web 2.0 social analytics, and population genomics. 
It’s easy to make big stories out of this: that we’re living in a new information society; or that 
we’re living in a surveillance society; or that we’re suffering from a data deluge; or (slightly 
at odds with the idea that we’re living in a surveillance society), that actually we’re living in 
an era in which methods and their data are being democratised by the supposed ubiquity of 
the internet and the tools that this makes available. Though you pays your money and you 
takes your choice, we want to be cautious when we come across large claims about epochal 
change, especially when they take forms reminiscent of technological determinism. The 
printing press, the creation of the railways, the development of electricity supply – all of these 
and many more have been treated as epoch-bending moments by some of those who lived 
through them.
22
 It’s difficult to think in ways that are critical and grounded in fields where 
hype (whether utopian and dystopian) is so prevalent. What is clear, however, is that there is a 
whole range of new methods out there, and that those methods exhibit concerns that have 
little to do with academic – and in some cases state and commercial – interests. So the 
message is clear. It is that unless social science keeps in touch with these changes, it will no 
longer be competent to contribute to new modes of social research. The advocates and the 
ecologies of social science method will start to pass us by. Of course we know that we’re 
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pushing at an open door here. As recent academic work illustrates, much good and critical 
social science work is doing just that
23
. 
 
Methods of the Social: II 
That, then is the social life of method, version one. The claim is that methods are of the social 
world; that they are tools that tend to reflect the concerns of those who advocate them, and 
that they subsist in particular ecologies. But then there’s the social life of method, version 
two; the idea that methods are in turn implicated in the social world. They are thus also of the 
social in the sense that they constitute and organise it. Or, to use the jargon, that they don’t 
just represent reality out there; but that they are also performative of the social. 
There’s a straightforward and matter-of-fact way of thinking about this. This is to say that 
methodologically speaking, what you see is what you get. This is because once you’re inside 
a method and you’re actually using it there isn’t much room for anything else. The point is 
that that which is invisible for all intents and purposes doesn’t exist, at least in practice, and at 
least for the moment.   
Take an example: the sample survey. This is not any example, because the sample survey is 
one of the most legitimated methods in use today. In the UK University teaching is assessed 
by the scores academic departments achieve in the National Student Survey. Our measures of 
crime are dependent on the British Crime Survey, which ‘corrects’ for the under-reporting of 
much crime to the police. The inflation rate is determined by responses to the Family 
Expenditure Survey, and so on.  
The survey works by first sampling people. And then it works by asking them questions about 
matters of fact (like age, gender, income bracket, religious affiliation, lifestyle choices) and 
matters of opinion (such as the performance of the government, attitudes to abortion, or meat-
eating). We might think of a survey as a bit like a methodological package deal. Like all 
package deals it has great virtues. It tells those who advocate it something about how people 
are planning to vote, or, say about their attitudes to global climate change. It’s also 
exceedingly useful because the basic methodological thinking doesn’t have to be done again. 
Surveying, after all, is a bog-standard method that has been industrialised and routinised. Its 
standards of quality control have been set, are widely agreed, and ethical guidelines are in 
place to police them. 
At the same time, like all package deals, it is indeed standardised. You get to see parts of 
social reality in particular ways, while you don’t see things that escape the package. Or more 
strongly (and now we’re getting to the point we want to make about constituting), it may be 
that you get to perform certain kinds of social realities whilst not performing others. You’re 
actually bringing realities into being while you’re shutting down others. 
Let us give an example from CRESC research. We have been involved in a project mapping 
people’s cultural tastes and practices, using an unusually comprehensive survey asking about 
respondents’ interests in reading, the visual arts, music, eating out, television and film, and 
sport
24
. The survey response shows a systematic difference between those who appear to be 
engaged in myriad activities: going to the opera, eating out in French restaurants, going to 
night clubs, and so on, as opposed to those who mainly appear to be inactive. However, our 
qualitative interviews give us cause for second thoughts. It turns out that the inactive are 
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actually often heavily engaged with their families and neighbours in ways that are not 
amenable to ready survey responses. And when one of the authors gave a presentation of 
these findings to market researchers, he found them nodding their heads and pointing out all 
the activities which often ‘slip through the net’ of the survey: walking the dog, hanging 
around on street corners, visiting the allotment, and so forth. And yet, these complexities can 
be forgotten about as powerful institutional agents seek to operate on the world in the name of 
the survey. 
The basic logic here is scarcely new. In the late 1920s US sociologist W.I. Thomas famously 
said: ‘If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.’25 Robert K. Merton 
elevated the principle into what he called the ‘reign of error’. His point was that a bank may 
fail because people first wrongly think that it is going to. But then this definition of the 
situation starts to become true
26. And Merton’s argument has been explored in the sociology 
of scientific knowledge and in finance, by Barry Barnes
27
 and Donald MacKenzie 
respectively
28
, and in governing by Ian Hacking.
29
 It’s obvious that these writers are onto 
something important. But we also suggest that the point needs to be reworked. Methods, it 
seems to us, are potentially more profoundly self-fulfilling than Merton’s ‘reign of error’ 
might suggest. To show why this might be the case, let us give another example from the 
social survey. And a particular social survey: a 2007 Eurobarometer on people’s attitudes to 
farm animal welfare and their habits when buying (or not buying) meat
30
. 
First let us say that the findings are instructive. For instance it tells us that many people in the 
EU are concerned about farm animal welfare (on a scale from 1-10 the average score is 7.8 
which seems pretty high). Quite a lot (though many fewer) also say that they think about the 
issue when they go to buy meat. The first general point, then, is that research methods such as 
surveys indeed teach us more about the social world. What we learn may or may not be 
stunning, but in the most straightforward way, their findings don’t count as self-fulfilling 
prophecies, and it would be stupid to pretend that they do. But if we press the argument a 
stage further, a different picture starts to emerge. At this point it’s useful to think in terms of 
dimensions. Perhaps we might imagine three. 
First, there’s the surface dimension that we’ve already touched upon: this has to do with 
consumer attitudes to farm animal welfare. This is where we make discoveries about the 
social world. 
Then, two, there’s a dimension that has to do with the character of people: that is, with 
particular subjectivities.
31
 Very briefly it’s like this. You can’t phone people up and ask them 
about the welfare of farm animals unless you also make a series of assumptions about the 
character of people and their competences. For instance, people are being endowed with 
attitudes: that is, with more or less long-term orientations or sentiments. The questions about 
what they do when they go to the shops then assume that they are choosers. The questions 
about information on products additionally assume that they are rational choosers because 
they may be influenced by that information. Finally, the questionnaire also assumes that 
people are more or less ethical beings, and that notions of moral right and wrong may 
influence their choices. 
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And after subjectivities? The survey also works by making a series of assumptions about the 
character of collectivities – and then reproduces these. This, then, is the third dimension.  
Individuals are abstracted from a place and then taken as representatives of that spatially 
delimited place. A particularly important example is the modern nation. There is no 
independent nation which does not appropriate to itself the ability to conduct censuses and 
surveys on its national population delimited by its sovereign boundaries. It is not incidental 
that new and developing states see the capacity to conduct national censuses and surveys as 
central parts of their ‘statehood’  
It is this which makes the Eurobarometer so interesting. It works as a composite of different 
national surveys, but it stretches this national formation and begins to hint at the possibility 
that a coherent ‘Europe’ can be imagined and re-enacted as a place and container of 
individuals; that is, as a bunch of citizen-consumers whose opinions and actions may be 
aggregated to form something called ‘the European citizen and/or consumer’; or as a set of 27 
different country collections with their aggregate ‘national citizens and/or consumers’. The 
point, then, is that a version of Europe and of its nations is being done in the survey results. 
For those who read it, for a moment at least, that is what Europe actually is. A stratified 
population of individuals endowed with attitudes and behaviours. 
A final example is from Ruppert’s work on censuses and how the category ‘Canadian’ 
became the fastest growing ‘ethnic’ origin group in Canada by the end of the twentieth 
century
32. Yet, until 1986, the census discouraged and advised against ‘Canadian’ in the 
classification of racial or ethnic origin
33
. Indeed from 1871 – 1971 ethnic Canadians simply 
did not exist, according to the Canadian census. Yet, in that period numerous respondents 
persistently and consistently wrote ‘Canadian’ as their answer such that by 1971 Statistics 
Canada was compelled for the first time to report their numbers at over 71,000
34
. By 1986, 
when multiple responses to the ethnic origin question were permitted, 0.5 per cent of 
respondents wrote  ‘Canadian’; in 1991 this rose to 4 per cent and by 1996, when ‘Canadian’ 
was added to the list of possible categories the percentage increased to 31 per cent. Where did 
all the Canadians come from? Many explanations have been put forward such as the role of 
political campaigns and a rising nationalist sentiment. In our words, these explanations are 
saying that the census category is of the social. However, Ruppert argues that the reporting 
and inclusion of the category itself on census forms was active in inventing or making up 
ethnic Canadians. The category was part of bringing into being a new kind of person that had 
not been self-conscious before through a process Ian Hacking calls ‘dynamic nominalism’35. 
The question here is not whether people identified themselves as ethnically ‘Canadian’ prior 
to being reported by the statistical authority in 1971. Some people may have identified as such 
while others many only have considered it a possible identification after seeing it beside a tick 
box on a census form. Rather, it concerns how methods can be active in making up people. 
Certainly, researchers have long acknowledged that how questions are posed and the 
categories listed can affect survey and census results. What they are suggesting but which 
usually gets turned into technical issues and debates about wording, is that methods are active 
in the making of the social. 
There is much more to be said, but we’ll stop. The important point is that in order to work and 
to generate empirical findings, all social research methods (the Eurobarometer, surveys or the 
census are just examples) have to pick and choose between different individual and collective 
realities. More strongly, they necessarily take it for granted that those realities exist ‘out there’ 
and separate from methods. And yet more strongly still (and this is really the core point), they 
tend to reproduce these in one form or another. As rational-ethical and (we might add) 
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verbally competent discretionary subjects, whose actions are partially shaped by relatively 
stable attitudes. That’s what the survey schedule does to people. That’s what they are turned 
into when they start to respond to the questions posed to them by the telephone interviewers. 
Or, when we stand back and look at the collectivity, statistically derived collections of 
particular person-subjectivities. (‘Canadians’. Or ‘the UK’. Or ‘The European Union’).  
Now a health warning. What we are not saying is that surveys are flawed and that we should 
really be doing (say) ethnographies, or focus groups. We are not rehearsing the classical anti-
positivist critique of standardised methods in order to seek refuge in humanistic methods. We 
are not saying that alternative methods discover subtle truths that elude techniques such as 
surveys. Don’t misread what we’re saying as an attack on quantitative social science. An 
analogous job could be done on any social science method (the qualitative included
36
), and 
we’re not in the slightest bit interested in making a contribution to technical methodological 
criticism. What we are doing, rather, is rehearsing an argument about what it is that methods, 
all methods, actually do. First we’re saying that they make discoveries about the world, and 
that those discoveries may surprise us. That’s why we conduct interviews and surveys and all 
the rest. But also, and counterintuitively, we’re saying that they also make more or less self-
fulfilling assumptions about the character of the social world. And that in so doing they tend 
to constitute it, so to speak, below the radar in ways that we scarcely notice. In short, that they 
tend to produce what John Law calls collateral realities: that is, realities that we don’t think 
about very much but that we’re all busy reproducing as we go about the daily methodological 
work of gathering and analysing data ‘about’ the social37. 
This, then, is the second part of the argument about the social life of methods. If methods are 
of the social, then methods also help to create social worlds, to make them current, and to 
circulate them. In short, the argument is that methods are fully part of the social world, 
embedded in and constitutive of it. This means that they are active agents of the social, and 
may be used to intervene in its constitution.  Thus methods and the social are co-constituting 
and cannot easily be disentangled and separated.  For this reason we can think of ‘methods of 
the social’ as having a life and liveliness where neither the social nor methods are settled, but 
are rather always in formation. In other words, methods have relations, circulate and 
(re)produce realities and have genealogies – of problems, interests, purposes – that are 
mutually implicated. 
 
Reflections 
So what follows? 
First, the agenda we’ve set ourselves suggests that methods are too important to be left 
exclusively to those who work on their technical specificities. We say this not as a put-down 
or a sneer. Technique is important. But what tends to happen is that boundaries get put round 
‘technical’ (and indeed ‘theoretical’) concerns, which is precisely what we are 
problematising. To attend to the social life of method is to put method back into the social. It 
is to assume that methods are of the social. It is to treat method as a phenomenon in its own 
right
38
. It is to work on the assumption that the binary divide between reality and 
representation that we touched on earlier doesn’t hold. It is to imagine, as feminist 
technoscience writer Donna Haraway puts it, that methods and their knowledges are 
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 Though perhaps with more difficulty, since the assumptions built into qualitative methods and so 
their forms of performativity are often less clearly defined. 
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 Law (2011, forthcoming). 
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 One might suggest that it would be a strange social science that reflected on and sought to 
characterise everything in the social world with the exception of its own methods. 
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situated
39
. It also to imply that the division between theory, method and substantive empirical 
field that we called the ‘methodological complex’, doesn’t make much sense either. Methods 
and substantive findings embed social theories. Indeed, they might be thought of as social 
theories in practice, theories that go in under the radar to form the social world by generating 
and reproducing collateral realities. But if this is right, then it also suggests that methods may 
be far more powerful theoretical tools than anything that we call Theory with a capital T. 
Second, and to loop back, it seems that when Merton talked of self-fulfilling prophecies he 
got it both right, and at the same time profoundly wrong. The problem is condensed by his 
catchy phrase, ‘the reign of error’. 
‘The self-fulfilling prophecy’ (he wrote), is, in the beginning a false definition of the 
situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come 
true.’40 
That which was false becomes true if enough people believe and act on it. Obviously this isn’t 
stupid. As we mentioned, it works well enough for a run on a bank. (Merton talked about a 
fictitious ‘Last National Bank of Millingville’, but for British readers the real case of 
Northern Rock probably comes more readily to mind). But there’s an inconvenience in his 
argument. This is the black and white distinction that he erects between those definitions of 
the situation that are true, and those that are false. This is because we need to think hard about 
what we mean by a ‘definition of the situation’ – which is what we were trying to do in the 
brief accounts of the workings of surveys and censuses. For definitions of the situation may 
be explicit, as in: ‘the bank is going to fail’. But they may also be deeply embedded in 
practices. This means that they may also be implicit. So we don’t imagine for one moment 
that people involved in the Eurobarometer survey actually sat there and said to themselves: 
‘yes, nation states are collections of individuals, that’s what they are.’ No-one made explicit 
theoretical judgements about the characteristics of nation states. But that is what the method 
was doing, even so. Implicitly. And once the Eurobarometer findings went into circulation, so 
too did a working definition of the nation state: that it’s a collection of individual rationally-
choosing subjects.  
Why is this important?  
The answer is that social realities are being constituted by social research methods way below 
the radar, and quite independently of what we think we are doing when we undertake social 
research. ‘Definitions of the situation’ prevail – and are enacted – even when we don’t make 
them explicit. But if this is right then it becomes important to excavate the versions of the 
social embedded in our methods, to bring them into the light, and to debate them. Do we 
actually want the kind of collectivities implied by ethnographies, by surveys, by focus groups, 
or by collations of transactional data? Do we even know what they are? And what kind of 
subjectivities and collectivities are they propagating? As you’ll see, we are no longer dealing 
only with methodological questions. We’re also trading in politics, in questions about the 
kinds of social worlds and subjectivities we want to help to make more real – to realise – in 
and through our methods. We’re dealing with what Annemarie Mol, STS empirical 
philosopher, calls ontological politics.
41 
So methods are too important to be left to methodologists alone. They are fully of the social, 
which means that we need to characterise and debate what it is that they do. But this allows us 
to move to a third and final point. For we want to suggest that it’s also becoming urgent to 
think structurally or institutionally about our methods, though in the present paper we will 
only gesture at this point. 
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Imagine a space, and imagine the practice of a method (a survey, an ethnography, it doesn’t 
matter) at the centre of that space. Then ask what’s implied, what’s being assumed, in the 
practice of that method? What goes with it? What else necessarily goes into the space? Any 
answer would include the following.  
 One, there are the researchers, those that do the knowing, so to speak; IPSOS-Mori or 
whoever. And then it would include the descriptions, the representations, being produced 
by the research. (The accounts of attitudes to animal welfare, or whatever it may be.) 
 Then, two, there are the putative realities being described. Unless the research is complete 
nonsense, there will be people out there with the relevant attitudes about farm animal 
welfare, at least when they’re confronted with an appropriate questionnaire. And then, 
alongside the realities being made manifest, there are the implicit realities too, the 
collateral realities tacitly embedded in the method, in (for instance) the form of rational 
subjectivities and statistical collectivities. This is the performative argument about how 
methods are of and constitute the social that we’ve just been rehearsing.   
 Then third, there’s what we might think of as an institutional context which includes the 
advocates (in the case of the Eurobarometer the DG 5 in the European Commission) but 
also, something that we’ve not talked about, the circuits through which the findings flow. 
The circuits probably include but extend beyond the advocates (For the Eurobarometer, 
these included the DG 5, the animal welfare NGOs, parts of the European retail and meat 
trade, and academics interested in farm animal welfare). 
Here’s the problem. Typically we think of (a) representations and findings, (b) the realities 
that relate to these and (we’re saying) are of them, and (c) their advocates and institutional 
contexts as being quite separate. But if we really want to understand the social life of method 
and its force then we need to break this separatist habit. We will need to understand that 
methods inhabit and help to reproduce a complex ecology of representations, realities and 
advocacies, arrangements and circuits. So survey methods (we pick on these but once again 
the point is general) inhabit and reproduce ecological forms that fit more or less comfortably 
together. And, this is important, these are patterns that don’t take kindly to being disrupted. 
The implication is that there’s a kind of triple lock at work here. And this, if it’s right, makes 
it very, very, difficult to know differently, to shape new realities, or to imagine different 
‘methods assemblages’ or modes of knowing42. For all of these have to be shifted together.  
Of course there are straws in the wind. The move to the digital that we discussed above is 
certainly significant – though epochal arguments about the character of these changes need to 
be resisted.
43
 In addition, it’s important not to lose sight of the fact that there are diverse 
methods at work within the standard assemblages that make up method. Even so, however, 
we think that the difficulties entailed in the triple lock that we’ve just mentioned catch what 
has been happening to the brave souls in, for instance, post-colonialism, STS, and feminism
44
.  
These are writers and activists who simultaneously seek to reground expertises and forms of 
knowledge, versions of the real, their advocates, and the larger ecologies of knowledge and 
expertise in ways that contest those that subsist most comfortably within the standard 
arrangements for knowing. The importance of spirits in road-building; the need to dream the 
land in order to keep it alive; the refusal of scientific expertise in debates about nuclear 
power; the idea that animals may be known in non-standard ways
45
, all of these are realities or 
modes of knowing that don’t find space in the standard methodological ecologies. To talk of 
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 The notion of ‘method assemblage’ is developed in Law (2004). 
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 See Savage, Ruppert and Law (2010). 
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 An indicative list of writers here would include Blaser (2010), Blaser et al. (2004), Chakrabarty 
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spirits makes little sense in those assemblages. The realities that these alternatives constitute 
are literally unthinkable. But, here’s the bottom line, until we can find ways of rethinking 
knowledges, realities and methods together in the same breath, we won’t have the tools that 
we need to understand the work being done by our methods. Neither will we be able to 
imagine a social that is radically different. 
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